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In a recent paper, Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2003)
examined the Federal Reserve’s response to VAR-identiﬁed
technology shocks. They found that during the Martin-Burns-
Miller era, the Federal Reserve responded to technology shocks
by overstabilizing output, while in the Volcker-Greenspan era,
the Federal Reserve adopted an inﬂation-targeting rule. We
extend their analysis to countries of the G-7; moreover, we
consider the factors that may contribute to diﬀering monetary
responses across countries. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd a relationship
between the volatility of capital investment, the type of mon-
etary policy rule, the responsiveness of the rule to output and
inﬂation ﬂuctuations, and the response to technology shocks.
JEL Codes: C32, E2, E52.
A number of studies employ structural vector autoregressions
(SVARs) to determine the roles of monetary policy shocks in gen-
erating cyclical ﬂuctuations in the United States (e.g., Christiano,
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Eichenbaum, and Evans [1999], and many others). Using both long-
and short-run identifying restrictions, various authors have explored
the empirical response of the economy to exogenous monetary inno-
vations. While the majority of the studies of monetary policy have
focused on exogenous money-growth or interest-rate shocks, recent
research has begun to investigate endogenous monetary policy—that
is, the central bank’s reaction to nonmonetary shocks. Many of these
papers expand on the notion of a monetary policy rule introduced by
Taylor (1993). Taylor conjectured that the central bank responds to
ﬂuctuations in inﬂation from a target and output from potential. Un-
fortunately, the vast majority of the empirical studies investigating
the monetary policy rules are decidedly divorced from consideration
of the forces driving these ﬂuctuations.
One such force that many economists believe contributes to the
business cycle ﬂuctuations that feed into the Taylor rule is exoge-
nous technological innovation. In an eﬀort to identify the empirical
eﬀects of technology shocks, Gal´ı (1999) estimated two models: a bi-
variate model of productivity and hours and a ﬁve-variable model
adding money, inﬂation, and interest rates. His identiﬁcation esti-
mates a decomposition of productivity and hours into innovations
to technology and nontechnology components by assuming that only
the former can have long-run eﬀects on labor productivity.1
Empirical identiﬁcation of the technology shock was a step in
developing a uniﬁed reduced-form framework to examine the role
that endogenous monetary policy plays in smoothing economic ﬂuc-
tuations.2 Along these lines, Gal´ı (2002) and Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and
Valle´s (2003—henceforth GLV) examined the endogenous response of
monetary policy to identiﬁed technology shocks in the United States.
GLV estimated a four-variable long-run restricted SVAR for the
United States with labor productivity, hours worked, the real inter-
est rate, and inﬂation. They ﬁnd that during the Volcker-Greenspan
1Gal´ı (1999) concluded that technology shocks do not drive business cycle
ﬂuctuations, in part, because hours decline in response to a positive technology
shock. However, variation in the impact response of hours to technology shocks is
observed depending on whether that series is diﬀerenced, detrended, or entered
in levels (see Francis and Ramey [2004]; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson
[2003]; and Uhlig [2003]). Our contribution is not to this debate, and the tenor
of our results does not depend on how hours enter the system.
2A number of papers have explored the role for monetary policy in a theoretical
framework (see Rotemberg and Woodford [1999], and King and Wolman [1999]).
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(VG) era, the Federal Reserve responded to technology shocks by
raising the nominal interest rate, while during the Martin-Burns-
Miller (MBM) era, the Federal Reserve lowered the rate. Further,
during the VG era, hours rose after a short decline and inﬂation was
virtually unchanged, while during the MBM era, hours and inﬂa-
tion fell persistently. GLV conclude that the empirical responses for
the VG era match theoretical responses obtained from an inﬂation-
targeting rule but that there exists evidence against the use of a
money-targeting rule during the MBM era.
Our contribution is to expand the scope of GLV to an interna-
tional context to determine whether the eﬀect of technology shocks
is substantively diﬀerent across the major industrialized countries.
In particular, we are interested in how the diﬀerent central banks re-
spond to technology shocks. We investigate cross-country variation
in the inﬂation and employment responses to technology shocks and
whether these cross-sectional diﬀerences alter the central bank’s re-
sponse. Further, we examine possible causes for these diﬀerences in
the context of a theoretical model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1
discusses the data we use for empirical investigation and outlines
the procedure to achieve identiﬁcation. Section 2 reviews the econo-
metric results. In particular, we analyze the responses to the iden-
tiﬁed technology shocks across countries and divide the countries
into three subgroups. Section 3 presents a model based on King and
Wolman (1996) that provides a theoretical foundation for discussion
of the empirical response of monetary policy to innovations in labor
productivity. Section 4 oﬀers a number of parameterizations of the
theoretical model that highlight potential causes for variations in
responses. Our goal will be to map the theoretical responses gener-
ated from the model simulations to the empirical responses observed
in the data. In section 5, we consider the merit of these theoretical
explanations by oﬀering some further empirical evidence. Section 6
oﬀers concluding remarks.
1. Econometric Framework
To attribute cross-country diﬀerences to features of a theoretical
model, we ﬁnd it prudent to ﬁrst present the empirical ﬁndings. We
employ the method of Gal´ı (1999) to identify the technology shocks.
36 International Journal of Central Banking December 2005
The speciﬁcation and the results of the estimation are discussed
below. To facilitate discussion, we identify three country subgroups
based on similarities in their responses to the technology shock.
1.1 Data
The model we estimate is a quarterly ﬁve-variable VAR with four
lags. The data used in the model are inﬂation, a short-term nom-
inal interest rate (either the three-month Treasury-bill rate or the
short-term money market rate), and the logs of real per capita GDP,
money, and the employment index for each of the G-7 countries.3
The inﬂation rate is taken to be the annualized growth rate of the
GDP deﬂator. Data were taken from the Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development (OECD) and the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF), with the exception of U.S. GDP and inﬂation
(Bureau of Economic Analysis), population (Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics), and interest rates (Federal Reserve Board). Labor productiv-
ity is constructed from the diﬀerence of log(real per capita GDP)
and log(employment index). Unit root pretests were conducted for
all variables. The null hypothesis of no unit root was rejected for all
countries’ labor productivity series except for Germany and Canada.
Summary statistics for the variables used and results of the unit root
tests are included in tables 1a–1c.
For the United States, there is signiﬁcant evidence of a change in
Federal Reserve policy during the Volcker disinﬂation.4 In addition,
the remainder of the countries in our sample exhibit evidence of
structural instability over the full sample (e.g., European monetary
uniﬁcation). To ascertain a stable sample for analysis, we conduct
Lagrange multiplier tests for each country to determine the timing
and signiﬁcance of a structural break in the coeﬃcient matrix of the
3The Treasury-bill rate represents the monetary policy instrument. We use
the T-bill rate, as it is the only short-term interest rate common to all countries.
Results using the T-bill rate were found to be consistent with those replacing it
with the federal funds rate for U.S. data.
For most countries, the money stock is M2. Exceptions are the United
Kingdom, for which we use M0, and Japan, for which we use M2 plus CDs.
4The policy break literature is too vast for a comprehensive survey here. We
direct the reader to two papers. Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2000) provide evi-
dence that the weight on inﬂation in the Federal Reserve’s objective function was
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent during VG than during MBM. Boivin and Giannoni (2002)
argue that the Federal Reserve’s inﬂation target declined in the VG period.
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Table 1a. Sample Periods, Break Dates, and
Lagrange Multiplier Stats
Country Full Sample Break Date LM Stat Estimated Period
Canada 1970:1–2002:2 1976:3 125.7 1976:3–2002:2
France 1978:1–1998:4 1983:1 130.4 1983:1–1998:4
Germany 1970:1–1998:4 1974:4 134.7 1974:4–1998:4
Italy 1971:1–1998:4 1976:2 199.6 1976:2–1998:4
Japan 1970:1–2002:2 1975:1 172.2 1975:1–2002:2
UK 1960:1–2002:2 1974:1 154.3
UK-pre 1960:1–1979:2
UK-post 1982:3–2002:2
US 1960:1–2002:3 1981:1 128.0
US-pre 1960:1–1979:2
US-post 1982:3–2002:3
Note: Structural break dates were determined based on the subsample
stability of the coeﬃcient matrix with productivity and employment in
diﬀerences and inﬂation and the interest rate in levels.
VAR. The results of the structural break tests, including the break
date, are included in table 1a. Additional tests of the subsamples
revealed no breaks. We constrain the samples for France, Germany,
and Italy to the pre-EU period. In most cases (the United States
and United Kingdom are exceptions), data limitations force us to
constrain estimation of postbreak subsamples in circumstances in
which breaks are signiﬁcant. For the United Kingdom and the United
States, we follow GLV and estimate separately the pre- and post-
Volcker–disinﬂation samples.5
5A number of studies of U.K. monetary history suggest a similarity between
the U.S. and U.K. break dates. We refer the reader to Nelson and Nikolov (2004)
for a study examining the policies of the Bank of England during the 1970s
and ’80s. Our initial tests identiﬁed a break date of 1974:1, which we found was
attributable to mandated reductions in employment in response to energy shocks.
We, therefore, include a dummy variable for that quarter.
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1.2 Identiﬁcation
In order to evaluate the eﬀects of technology shocks and the subse-
quent monetary responses, we specify a model in which we identify
technology using both long-run restrictions. The MA representation
of our structural VAR is
Yt = C(L)εt, (1)
where Yt =
[
∆xt ∆nt πt rt − πt ∆mt
]′
and ε =
[
εx εn εp εr εm
]′
.
C(L) is a polynomial matrix in the lag operator, xt denotes the log
of labor productivity, nt is the log of employment index, πt is the
annualized inﬂation rate computed from the GDP deﬂator, rt is the
short-term real T-bill rate, and ∆mt is the growth rate of money.6
As per table 1, we tested and failed to reject unit roots for pro-
ductivity and employment; therefore, these variables enter the VAR
in ﬁrst diﬀerences.7 Inﬂation and the real interest rate enter the VAR
in annualized rates.8 The long-run restrictions that identify the tech-
nology shock εx imply C1j(1) = 0, j > 1, restricting the unit root in
productivity to originate solely from the technology shock.
There exist some alternative schemes for identifying technology
shocks. Uhlig (1999) shows that sign restrictions on the impulse re-
sponses can be used to identify monetary policy shocks. Uhlig (2003)
identiﬁes a technology shock as that which generates a ﬁxed forecast-
error variance taken from a calibrated theoretical model at the desig-
nated horizon. In this case, though, the calibrated model determines
the identiﬁcation and no inference can be drawn from the cross-
sectional variance. Finally, Francis, Owyang, and Roush (2005) iden-
tify technology as that which maximizes the forecast-error variance
6Output does not enter explicitly into the model. Instead, the output response
is imputed from the labor productivity and labor index responses. Similarly, the
model is estimated with the real interest rate, and the nominal interest-rate
response is imputed.
7The unit root tests fail to reject the presence of a stochastic trend in em-
ployment. To check the robustness of the results, we also detrended employment
using the H-P ﬁlter and reestimated the model using employment in levels. These
results are consistent with employment entering in ﬁrst diﬀerences.
8In addition to these data, we estimated a ﬁve-variable model that included
a trade-weighted exchange rate and a seven-variable VECM that included con-
sumption, investment, and velocity. Results were unchanged. We forgo formal
discussion of these alternative models here, as it introduces additional complex-
ity into the theoretical model and obfuscates comparisons.
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of labor productivity. They show that the resulting impulse responses
for the United States are qualitatively similar to those obtained from
the long-run restriction identiﬁcation.
2. Empirical Results
To ease comparison of the results across studies, in ﬁgure 1 we ﬁrst
present the response to a one-standard-deviation technology shock
for the post-Volcker disinﬂation in the United States. We note here
that productivity and, hence, output for each country respond as
expected, yielding permanent increases in each variable.9 The es-
timated technology shock induces a brief decline in employment;
after a few quarters, employment rises persistently. Moreover, the
technology shock is deﬂationary, leading to a two-year period in
which prices permanently decline. The Federal Reserve responds to
lower inﬂation by decreasing the nominal interest rate; the relative
decline in the nominal rate and inﬂation is such that there is a brief
rise in the real rate.
These results, somewhat consistent with GLV, might suggest that
during the Volcker-Greenspan era, the Federal Reserve employs an
optimal monetary rule. In GLV the technology shock is inﬂationary,
so the Federal Reserve’s optimal response is to raise the nominal
rate. In our case, the Federal Reserve responds by injecting money
and lowering the nominal rate in order to combat lower inﬂation.10
The Federal Reserve achieves, according to the empirical evidence,
long-run price stability, but does not completely damp out all of the
short-run price eﬀects.
In order to facilitate further discussion, we collect the remain-
ing countries (including the pre-Volcker United States) into three
subgroups based on the response of their central banks to the tech-
nology shock and the attributes of the shock itself (i.e., its impact
on prices and employment). The point estimates for the impulse
9Because we will discuss multiple countries simultaneously, we present only
the point estimates for the impulse responses for select variables. The full sample
of impulse responses with their associated 68 percent bootstrapped error bands
are supplied in an appendix. We include the responses of both money growth and
the log level of money, as well as the labor productivity response.
10The diﬀerence between our impulse responses and those of GLV stems from
the inclusion of money growth in our baseline VAR. Our results are identical to
GLV when we exclude money growth.
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responses of both real and nominal interest rates, inﬂation, money,
and employment to a one-standard-deviation technology shock for
the ﬁrst country grouping (France, Japan, and the postbreak United
Kingdom) are depicted in ﬁgure 2. Employment for these countries,
while declining in the short run, rises overall.11
For this ﬁrst grouping, the central bank raises the nominal inter-
est rate in response to a technology shock, although Japan’s response
is somewhat delayed. The real interest rate for two of the three coun-
tries declines in the short run. However, for all three countries, it rises
within a few quarters and remains either positive or statistically
negligible. Long-run stabilization of the real rate is accomplished
through a rise in the nominal interest rate in response to an increase
in prices. The short-run fall in the real rate in France and Japan is
due to the sizable increase in inﬂation on impact in both countries.
The point estimates for the impulse responses to the technology
shock for the second country group—consisting of Canada, Germany,
the prebreak United Kingdom, and the United States (MBM)—are
reported in ﬁgure 3. This group is characterized by an overall decline
in the nominal rate and relatively persistent declines in employment
(usually more than seventeen quarters) and inﬂation. This persis-
tent reduction in employment is theoretically consistent with a job-
destructive technology shock (see Caballero and Hammour 1994).
A cursory examination of the monetary response for this group,
characterized by a decrease in the nominal interest rate, might in-
dicate a diﬀerence in the behavior of monetary policy from the
ﬁrst country grouping. The monetary authority appears to be
accommodating the technology shock, lowering nominal rates in the
face of falling employment. The third panel of ﬁgure 3, however,
shows that countries in this group either raise or hold real interest
rates constant.12 Since these countries experience deﬂationary tech-
nology shocks, the central bank maintains the real interest rate via
a reduction in the nominal interest rates and, for most countries, a
reduction in the rate of money growth.
11France’s employment response is slightly diﬀerent. It rises in the short to
medium run but turns negative after ﬁfteen quarters.
12Canada’s real rate rises in the short run but is persistently negative after ﬁve
quarters, while the U.S. prebreak rate is negative on impact but is close to zero
in the long run.
44 International Journal of Central Banking December 2005
F
ig
u
re
2.
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
R
es
p
on
se
s
fo
r
G
ro
u
p
1
(F
ra
n
ce
,
Ja
p
an
,
U
K
-P
os
t)
O
ut
pu
t
00
.2
0
.4
0
.6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
Q
ua
rt
er
F
ra
n
ce
J
ap
an
U
K
-P
o
st
In
fl
at
io
n
-0
.3
-0
.1
50
0
.1
5
0
.3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
F
ra
n
ce
J
ap
an
U
K
-P
o
st
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
-0
.2
-0
.10
0
.1
0
.2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
F
ra
n
ce
J
ap
an
U
K
-P
o
st
N
om
in
al
 I
nt
er
es
t R
at
e
-0
.40
0
.4
0
.8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
M
on
ey
 G
ro
w
th
-0
.2
-0
.10
0
.1
0
.2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
F
ra
n
ce
 (M
2
)
J
ap
an
 (
M
2
+
C
D
s)
U
K
-P
o
st
 (M
0
)
R
ea
l 
In
te
re
st
 R
at
e
-0
.8
-0
.40
0
.4
0
.8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
Q
ua
rt
er
F
ra
n
ce
J
ap
an
U
K
-P
o
st
F
ra
n
ce
J
ap
an
U
K
-P
o
st
Q
ua
rt
er
Q
ua
rt
er
Q
ua
rt
er
Q
ua
rt
er
Percent
Percent
Percentage Points
Percentage Points Percentage Points Percentage Points
Vol. 1 No. 3 Varying Monetary Response to Technology Shocks 45
F
ig
u
re
3.
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
R
es
p
on
se
s
fo
r
G
ro
u
p
2
(C
an
ad
a,
G
er
m
an
y,
U
K
-P
re
,
U
S
-P
re
)
O
ut
pu
t
-0
.20
0
.2
0
.4
0
.6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
Q
ua
rt
er
C
an
ad
a
G
er
m
an
y
U
K
-P
re
U
S
-P
re
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
-0
.3
-0
.2
-0
.10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
M
on
ey
 G
ro
w
th
-0
.3
-0
.2
-0
.10
0
.1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
Q
ua
rt
er
C
an
ad
a 
(M
2
)
G
er
m
an
y 
(M
2
)
U
K
-P
re
 (M
0
)
U
S
-P
re
       (M
2
)
In
fl
at
io
n
-1
-0
.50
0
.5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
Q
ua
rt
er
N
om
in
al
 I
nt
er
es
t R
at
e
-1
-0
.500
.5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
R
ea
l 
In
te
re
st
 R
at
e
-1
-0
.50
0
.51
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
Q
ua
rt
er
Q
ua
rt
er
Q
ua
rt
er
Percent
Percentage Points Percentage Points Percentage Points
Percent
C
an
ad
a
G
er
m
an
y
U
K
-P
re
U
S
-P
re
C
an
ad
a
G
er
m
an
y
U
K
-P
re
U
S
-P
re
Percentage Points
C
an
ad
a
G
er
m
an
y
U
K
-P
re
U
S
-P
re
C
an
ad
a
G
er
m
an
y
U
K
-P
re
U
S
-P
re
46 International Journal of Central Banking December 2005
The ﬁnal country to be considered is Italy, whose impulse re-
sponses are shown in ﬁgure 4. Here, the response of employment to
the technology shock is a persistent reduction in labor, consistent
with the responses of the countries in group 2. However, in contrast
to the countries in group 2, there is a signiﬁcant rise in prices be-
tween two and ﬁve quarters after the initial shock. The monetary
authority responds to the technology shock with a (large) increase
in the nominal interest rate, leading to a rise in the real interest rate.
Figures 1 through 4 report point estimates and, hence, do not
reﬂect that the impulse responses are computed with uncertainty,
which could aﬀect our country groupings. In an eﬀort to gauge this
uncertainty, we conducted Monte Carlo experiments to determine the
percentage of draws of the joint impulse responses for each country
that satisﬁes our grouping restrictions. Results from these experi-
ments are reported in table 2. Evident from these experiments is that,
except for the postbreak U.K. sample, the majority of draws satisfy
our grouping restrictions.13 Grouping countries based on statisti-
cally signiﬁcant responses yields results similar to those presented
here.
It comes as no surprise that the central banks in our sample
respond diﬀerently to technology shocks. This is especially true given
that the labor and price responses vary considerably across countries.
However, in each case, the central bank acts to increase the real
interest rate in response to the shock, regardless of the direction
of the inﬂation response.14 In order to explain this cross-country
variation, we propose a representative agent model in the following
section.
3. Model
The model we present is a modiﬁed version of the model proposed in
King and Wolman (1996) and incorporates both a technology shock
13Although the postbreak U.K. sample impulse responses meet the joint
group 2 restrictions in less than half of the draws, the sample qualiﬁes for other
groups even more infrequently. Thus, we have chosen to categorize the postbreak
U.K. sample based on the restrictions its responses meet most often.
14In some cases, the central bank is not entirely successful in increasing or
maintaining the real interest rate. We, however, focus on the comovement between
inﬂation and the nominal interest rate. In most cases, the comovement is positive.
Vol. 1 No. 3 Varying Monetary Response to Technology Shocks 47
F
ig
u
re
4.
E
m
p
ir
ic
al
R
es
p
on
se
s
fo
r
G
ro
u
p
3
(I
ta
ly
)
O
ut
pu
t
0
0
.0
4
0
.0
8
0
.1
2
0
.1
6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
Q
ua
rt
er
Percent
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
-0
.3
-0
.2
-0
.10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
Q
ua
rt
er
Percent
-0
.1
2
-0
.0
8
-0
.0
40
0
.0
4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
Q
ua
rt
er
M
on
ey
 (
M
2)
 G
ro
w
th
Percentage Points
In
fl
at
io
n
-0
.4
5
-0
.3
-0
.1
50
0
.1
5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
Q
ua
rt
er
Percentage Points
N
om
in
al
 I
nt
er
es
t R
at
e
0
0
.2
0
.4
0
.6
0
.8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
Q
ua
rt
er
Percentage Points
R
ea
l I
nt
er
es
t R
at
e
0
0
.3
0
.6
0
.9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
Q
ua
rt
er
Percentage Points
48 International Journal of Central Banking December 2005
Table 2. Uncertainty
Percentage of Runs
Country Meeting Restrictions∗
Canada 60%
France 68%
Germany 89%
Italy 71%
Japan 75%
UK-pre 61%
UK-post 47%
US-pre 73%
US-post 58%
∗5,000 Monte Carlo draws from the posterior
distribution for the impulse response.
and a monetary policy reaction function. The model examines the op-
timization problems of ﬁrms and workers and the dynamic responses
to idiosyncratic technology shocks under diﬀering monetary policy
rules. The nature of the impulse responses to a technology shock will
hinge on whether the policy of the central bank is targeting money
growth or employing a Taylor rule.
Our model is a representative agent model with a central bank.
The household maximizes lifetime utility subject to time and bud-
get constraints. Additionally, households experience a time cost of
acquiring consumption goods—a shopping time. Firms face capital
adjustment costs and maximize proﬁts under a Calvo (1983) pricing
scheme. Finally, the central bank can adopt either a Taylor rule or
a money-growth-targeting rule.
We could incorporate additional model features to enhance re-
alism at the expense of expositional eﬃcacy. That is, increas-
ing the number of model features—even those with well-known
implications—can introduce enough cross-sectional variation in re-
sponses that it becomes impossible to isolate the source. We at-
tempt to avoid this problem by incorporating only features that are
both possible causes of cross-country diﬀerences and yield potential,
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testable explanations. Our goal is to write the most parsimonious
model possible that still may generate suﬃcient cross-sectional vari-
ation to explain our empirical results.15 Our model follows.
3.1 The Household’s Problem
The household’s current period utility depends on its level of con-
sumption and leisure:
Ut = ln ct + φ ln lt,
where ct is consumption, lt is leisure, and φ is a weighting factor.
The household’s problem is to maximize expected lifetime utility
max

Et
∞∑
j=0
βjUt+j

 ,
subject to a budget constraint
Et
∞∑
j=0
∆t,jPt+jct+j ≤ Et
∞∑
j=0
∆t,jPt+j
[
wt+jnt+j − Rt+j1 + Rt+j mt+j
]
+ other wealth,
and a normalized working day
nt+j + lt+j + ht+j = 1.
Here, β and ∆ are discount factors; mt is real money balances; Pt is
the price level; wt is the real wage; Rt is the nominal interest rate;
nt and lt are labor and leisure, respectively; and ht is shopping time.
Shopping time captures the fact that it is costly, in terms of time, to
15Sticky wages (Smets and Wouters 2005), for example, deliver more persis-
tence than sticky prices but yield nearly equivalent aggregate results for tech-
nology shocks. Habit formation in consumption (Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher
[2001] and Francis and Ramey [forthcoming]) is used in conjunction with invest-
ment adjustment costs to match empirical movements in stock prices and generate
a decline in short-run employment. However, we viewed testing for cross-country
variation in habit formation as problematic.
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undertake real consumption activity. The form of the shopping time
technology is
ht = h
(
mt
ct
)
= α + κ
(
mt
ct
)
− υ
υ − 1ζ
1/υ
(
mt
ct
) υ−1
υ
,
with h′(·) < 0.
3.2 The Firm’s Problem
We assume ﬁrms are monopolistic competitors. A ﬁrm’s decision de-
pends on its current capital stock kt and the expectation of the future
consumption good price Pt+j and real wage wt+j . Firms choose the
output level, employment, and investment to maximize the expected
value of future proﬁts
EtΠ = Et
∞∑
j=0
∆t,j [Pt+jyt+j − Pt+jwt+jnt+j − Pt+j it+j ],
subject to a constant returns to scale production technology,
yt+j = At+jf (nt+j , kt+j), (2)
and an investment constraint,
kt+j+1 − kt+j = Φ
(
it+j
kt+j
)
kt+j − δkt+j ,
where δ is the capital depreciation rate and Φ
(
i
k
)
is a positive, in-
creasing, and concave function that represents the increasing cost of
augmenting capital too rapidly.
Firms set prices according to the staggered price-setting scheme
of Calvo (1983), with probability η that ﬁrms do not adjust prices
and with probability 1 − η that they do. This implies that the
fraction of ﬁrms that last adjusted price j periods ago is given by
θj = (1− η)ηj.
The aggregate price level is, then, assumed to follow
Pt =

 ∞∑
j=0
θj(P ∗t−j)
1−ε


1/(1−ε)
,
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where P ∗t−j is the price chosen by ﬁrms that adjusted their price j
periods ago.
The coeﬃcient At+j in (2) is a productivity shifter that we will
identify as the level of technology. Shocks to At+j will be interpreted
as shocks to technology; we model these shocks as random walk
processes, thus, introducing some persistence into the model while
matching the empirical identiﬁcation scheme.16 Our primary inter-
est is to determine the central bank’s reaction and the subsequent
dynamic response of model variables to innovations in At+j under
alternative policy rules.
3.3 Monetary Policy Rules and First-Order Conditions
In addition to the behavior of the agents, the rule followed by the
monetary authority will inﬂuence the responses of the economy to a
technology shock. We assume that the monetary authority can adopt
one of two policy rules:
1. Taylor Rule: The central bank manipulates interest rates each
period to achieve a given annualized inﬂation rate target π∗.
The policy rule would be of the form:17
Rt = Rt−1 + a (yt − y∗) + b (πt − π∗),
where y∗ is potential output.
2. Money Supply Targeting: The central bank targets the rate of
growth of money supply; that is, money growth is held con-
stant:
log(mt)− log(mt−1) = ϕ
where mt is the quantity of money.
16We examined cases in which the technology shock was stationary yet per-
sistent. We found no qualitative diﬀerences in the theoretical impulse responses.
We concluded that cross-sectional diﬀerences in this speed of adjustment were
not responsible for the qualitative diﬀerences in response to technology shocks
(although a more quantitative examination might consider this as a free param-
eter). Thus, we forgo discussion of these alternative processes here.
17Here, we deviate from King and Wolman (1996). In their model, they do not
explicitly model a Taylor-type rule of this form.
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The endogenous reaction of monetary policy to the technology
shock will depend on which of the two policy rules the monetary au-
thority chooses to adopt. Given the setup of the model, the following
ﬁrst-order conditions obtain:
1
ct
= −λtPt
[
1− κwt
ct
mt
ct
+
wt
ct
(
mt
ct
) υ−1
υ
ζ
1
υ
]
MU of Consumption,
φ
lt
= −λtPtwt Labor Supply,
−wt
ct
[
κ−
(
mt
ct
)−1
υ
ζ
1
υ
]
=
Rt
1 + Rt
Cash Balance Holding,
γtαAtn
α−1
t k
1−α
t = Ptwt Labor Demand,
and
γt(1− α)Atnαt k−αt = Zt Capital Decision,
where Zt is the rental price of capital, γt and λt are shadow prices,
and α is the share of labor in the production function. These ﬁrst-
order conditions allow us to simulate the model and determine the
policy reaction and subsequent theoretical responses to innovations
to technology.
4. Simulations
The model that we have presented above consists of a few key pa-
rameters that can aﬀect the shapes and, more importantly, the signs
of the theoretical impulse responses to technology shocks. In partic-
ular, we explore diﬀerences induced by the two policy rules (Taylor
rule or money-growth targeting) and by changes in the cost of capital
adjustment. In table 3, we oﬀer four model parameterizations that
characterize a variety of alternative responses to a positive technol-
ogy shock.18 The diﬀerences in the price responses underlie variations
in the employment response to technological innovations.
18We considered but do not report changes in the agents’ relative valuation of
leisure to consumption, the time cost of purchasing consumption goods, and the
rate at which ﬁrms can change prices. We found that these parameters are not key
to explaining cross-country diﬀerences in the monetary response to technology
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Our goal is to generate theoretical impulse responses. To this end,
we linearize the model around its steady-state growth path (King
and Watson 1998). Figure 5 plots the theoretical impulse responses
of selected variables to a 1 percent positive shock to technology under
the Taylor rule for the ﬁrst parameterization, which we henceforth
term a creative technology shock. The theoretical technology shock
causes a level shift in output that in turn requires, from the ﬁrst-
order conditions, that the capital-labor ratio increase. Since the cost
of adjusting capital is suﬃciently low, when labor increases due to
the rise in average productivity, capital responds positively to the
shock. Thus, a technology shock causes an increase in output that
exceeds the shift in potential and, thus, leads to an increase in prices.
The central bank, with a stable Taylor rule (in the sense of Clarida,
Gal´ı, and Gertler 2000), responds by raising both the nominal and
real interest rates to counteract rising prices.
The second and third parameterizations are presented together
in ﬁgure 6. These parameterizations exemplify how both a mone-
tary targeting rule and a Taylor rule can produce similar theoretical
responses. One major diﬀerence between these two speciﬁcations is
how the decline in employment is generated. When the policymaker
employs a Taylor rule in this parameterization, high adjustment costs
cause a rigidity in the capital market. The shift in the level of output
again indicates an increase in the capital-labor ratio that can only
be achieved by a short-run reduction in employment. This decline
in employment endures until ﬁrms can adjust their capital stock.
Suﬃciently rigid capital markets can therefore produce persistent
employment reductions. Since the central bank’s Taylor rule in this
parameterization places a relatively high weight on output, the level
shift in output causes the policymaker to underestimate the nec-
essary reduction in the nominal interest rate. The change in the
real interest rate is positive and prices fall. We henceforth term this
parameterization a destructive technology shock.
In the case of money-growth targeting, the level shift in output
forces the consumer to spend more time shopping. In the previous
parameterization, the central bank injects liquidity by dropping the
interest rate, thereby decreasing the shopping time cost. Here, the
shocks. They may, however, be valuable in explaining other business cycle vari-
ables, including, for example, the eﬀect of technology on consumption. We leave
this for future research.
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Figure 5. Theoretical Responses Parameterization 1
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central bank holds the money-growth rate constant. Thus, agents
switch out of leisure and labor into purchase of consumption goods.
In this case, the decline in employment obtains not from a rigidity
in the capital market but from a rigidity induced by the central
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Figure 6. Theoretical Responses Parameterizations 2 and 3
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bank’s policy rule.19 The relative tightness in money also produces
the decline in prices.
19A negative employment response also may reﬂect the possibility that a domi-
nant wealth eﬀect drives down employment and causes the technology shock to be
deﬂationary. After a positive productivity shock, ﬁrms’ markups rise, increasing
the wedge between the marginal productivity of labor and the real wage. Because
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Finally, we present a fourth parameterization in ﬁgure 7 that
reﬂects a policymaker employing a Taylor rule with a low weight
on inﬂation but an even lower weight on output. As in the second
parameterization, a high capital adjustment cost makes employment
decline. In this case, the central bank does not respond to output
but instead responds to the upward pressure on prices by raising the
nominal interest rate. However, since the coeﬃcient on inﬂation in
the policymaker’s Taylor rule is less than unity, the magnitude of
the response is insuﬃcient to fully balance the pressure on prices
and inﬂation rises.
We summarize the individual eﬀects of the varied parameters
as follows: higher capital adjustment costs cause employment to fall
since investment is slow to adjust and consumption demand is curbed
with sticky prices, which forces households toward more leisure.
Price and interest rate responses depend jointly on the degree of
price stickiness and the nature of the monetary policymaker’s rule.
Since prices are sticky, a relatively higher coeﬃcient on inﬂation
in the Taylor rule lowers the magnitude of the price response. How-
ever, the instability of the Taylor rule under parameterization 4
causes the responses of interest rate and inﬂation to be longer lived
even though they are smaller in magnitude.
5. Explaining Cross-Country Diﬀerences
In the previous section, we show that diﬀerences in the theoretical
responses to the technology shock can be attributed to either diﬀer-
ences in the monetary authority’s rule (i.e., stable/unstable Taylor
rule or money-growth targeting) or the degree of rigidity in the ad-
justment of the capital stock. We have shown that the empirical
impulse responses from section 2 diﬀer across countries. Here, we
consider whether variations in the parameters that spur diﬀerences
in the theoretical model can be possible explanations for these em-
pirical cross-country diﬀerences.20
this wedge is expected to diminish over time, expected real wages rise and agents
reduce their short-run labor supplied due to the intertemporal substitution eﬀect.
See ﬁgure 6 in King and Wolman (1996).
20We acknowledge that examination of the responses to other types of
shocks (e.g., monetary policy shocks, capital tax shocks) might prove fruitful
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Figure 7. Theoretical Responses Parameterization 4
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Apart from the U.S. (VG) responses, the remaining countries
(including the U.S. [MBM] period) seem to be well characterized by
diﬀerences in the three key elements: the variable targeted by the
in identifying cross-country diﬀerences. However, this is not our focus and we
leave this to future research.
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central bank, the parameters of the policy rule, and capital market
rigidities. GLV concluded that the U.S. (VG) period can be charac-
terized by an optimal monetary policy rule. We refrain from further
discussion of this period and, instead, focus on the nature of re-
maining cross-country variation. However, before we conclude that
these diﬀerences in the impulse responses can truly be attributed to
these country characteristics, we explore further evidence. We con-
duct these tests in this section.
5.1 Tests of Monetary Targeting
For the four countries in group 2, we are unable to distinguish the-
oretically between the responses of a country with a money-growth
rule with ﬂexible capital markets and a country with an unsta-
ble Taylor rule with rigid capital markets. Empirically, we can test
whether the central bank appears to be conducting policy as though
it were targeting money growth. We accomplish this by evaluating
the statistical signiﬁcance of the money-growth impulse responses
(see GLV ﬁgure 8 and their analysis).
During the sample periods, the responses of the money-growth
rate in Germany is statistically negligible, which suggests that the
Bundesbank seems to behave as though it targets money growth.
On the other hand, the U.S. (MBM) period results are consistent
with GLV. The response of money to the technology shock for the
United States (MBM) is statistically signiﬁcant on impact and not
suggestive of the Federal Reserve targeting money growth. Addi-
tionally, for Canada and the prebreak United Kingdom, the money-
growth-rate responses are also negative on impact, providing some
evidence against money targeting by the Bank of Canada and the
Bank of England. While the point estimates for the responses for
these countries are negative, they are not signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
level. There remains some possibility that Canada and the prebreak
United Kingdom are targeting money. Fortunately, our theoretical
model allows us to make a further test of money targeting by con-
sidering the rigidity of capital markets.
5.2 Tests of Capital Adjustment
Under the Taylor-rule speciﬁcation, the direction of the theoretical
response of employment depends on the cost of adjusting capital.
While a direct measure of the adjustment cost is unavailable, we
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Table 4. Cross-Country Diﬀerences
Detrended Investment Taylor Rule Coeﬀ.
Volatility* Inﬂation Output
Group 1
France 7.49 1.33a 0.27∗∗
Japan 20.70 2.04a 0.08
UK-post 13.76 0.98a 0.19
Group 2
Canada 12.71 2.25d,∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗
Germany 2.85 1.31a 0.25∗∗∗∗
UK-pre 4.72 0.315c 0.52
US-pre 7.35 0.86b 0.39
Group 3
Italy 6.14 0.91a 0.10∗∗
∗Gross Fixed Capital Formation.
∗∗Includes coeﬃcient on relative price of domestic currency to an
EU area bundle of prices.
∗∗∗Coeﬃcients estimated with the assumption of a
forward-looking Taylor rule and a backward-looking
inﬂation-targeting rule.
∗∗∗∗Since Germany was estimated with a linearly detrended labor
coeﬃcient, its output coeﬃcient is not directly comparable to that
of the other countries.
Note: Taylor rule coeﬃcients extracted from:
aClarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2000).
bClarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1998).
cNelson and Nikolov (2004).
dFougere (2001).
consider a crude proxy of the capital market rigidity in the volatility
of quarterly investment. We posit that a higher capital adjustment
cost implies a greater rigidity in the capital market and, thus, lower
investment volatility. The ﬁrst column of table 4 shows the detrended
investment volatility for each country.21
21Further research might examine more disaggregated measures of investment
or capital stock volatility.
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The theoretical model predicts that all the countries in group 1
(France, Japan, and the postbreak United Kingdom) and the poten-
tial money-growth-targeting country in group 2, Germany, should
have low capital adjustment costs and, thus, more-volatile invest-
ment. On the other hand, Canada, the prebreak United Kingdom,
the United States (MBM), and Italy should have high capital ad-
justment costs and, thus, less-volatile investment. Although only
suggestive, the ordinal ranking of the investment volatilities does
bear close resemblance to the prediction. Germany, however, has in-
vestment volatility inconsistent with the theoretical prediction. Ger-
many’s volatility is relatively too low as a money-growth-targeting
country.22 Canada’s volatility is relatively higher than expected if it
has truly adopted a Taylor rule, but is consistent with the hypothesis
of money targeting.23
5.3 Taylor-Rule Coeﬃcients
A ﬁnal theoretical implication of the model is that, in order to
match the empirical responses, the degree of output and inﬂation
sensitivity in the policymaker’s Taylor rule must vary. In order to
uncouple the price and employment responses for Italy, the Taylor
rule implied by the empirical model must be unresponsive to output
and inﬂation. To reveal whether the empirical results are consistent
with our theoretical interpretation, we compare some benchmark
Taylor-rule coeﬃcients from the literature. The results are shown
in table 4.24 Since these studies explicitly set out to model and
estimate monetary policy reaction functions, in this regard, they
22We point out here that these results are merely suggestive. Rigidities in
capital investment can enter through channels other than capital adjustment
costs.
23Canada changed from money targeting to inﬂation targeting mid-sample
(Bernanke et al. 1999). While we found no evidence of a break in the model, it
remains plausible that the change occurred too late to signiﬁcantly alter Canada’s
classiﬁcation as a money-targeting country.
24Note that there are features of the theoretical model, such as capital ad-
justment cost and shopping time, that may not be captured in these empirical
estimates, which may negate any direct comparison of the two. However, we pro-
ceed with the comparison under the assumption that either (i) these factors aﬀect
(contemporaneous) output and employment found in the Taylor rule or (ii) their
inﬂuence is not suﬃcient to render the comparison useless.
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provide more accurate coeﬃcients than those from our interest-rate
equations.
Three key results are suggested from the Taylor-rule equations
obtained from the literature. First, the Taylor rule for each of the
group 1 countries has an inﬂation coeﬃcient statistically equal to or
greater than 1 and an output coeﬃcient less than 0.5. This is consis-
tent with the parameterization from our theoretical model and the
relatively high investment volatility discussed in the previous section.
Second, the prebreak Bank of England appears relatively too respon-
sive to ﬂuctuations in output versus inﬂation. This, coupled with the
United Kingdom’s relatively low investment volatility, supports the
hypothesis that the prebreak United Kingdom is, in fact, an “un-
stable” Taylor-rule country rather than a money-growth-targeting
country. Germany, on the other hand, appears to have a stable
Taylor rule, which is inconsistent with theory. This leads us to believe
that Germany is, indeed, money-growth targeting, a result consistent
with previous literature (Bernanke et al. 1999). Third, the Bank of
Italy appears relatively unresponsive (compared with model predic-
tions) to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation. In combination with its relatively
low investment volatility, Italy’s responses are consistent with our
theoretical model that includes high capital adjustment costs and
an unstable Taylor rule.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we extend the empirical analysis of Gal´ı (1999) and
Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2003) to an international context. We
ﬁnd considerable cross-country variation in the response to the iden-
tiﬁed technology shock. In particular, we identify three subgroups
consisting of countries whose responses are similar in shape and di-
rection. The two elements that characterize these diﬀerences are the
direction of the price/employment/interest-rate response and the co-
movement between employment and prices. One ﬁnding of particular
interest is that the identiﬁed responses during the Volcker-Greenspan
era are not replicated in any other G-7 country during any time
period.
Using a theoretical model adapted from King and Wolman
(1996), we ﬁnd that the empirical responses can be matched with
theoretical responses. Diﬀerences in these theoretical responses can
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be attributed to alternative policy rules and changes in the cost of
capital adjustment. Further tests verify that these country character-
istics could, indeed, have some explanatory power. While our results
are by no means conclusive, they do suggest a number of theoreti-
cally consistent similarities across countries in each subgroup. While
we believe more investigation into these cross-country comparisons is
warranted, the initial indication is that the manner in which mone-
tary policy is conducted and the degree of rigidity in capital markets
may be determining factors in a country’s response to technology
shocks.
64 International Journal of Central Banking December 2005
Appendix. Empirical Responses for all Variables by Group
and Country (With 68% Bootstrapped Error Bands)
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